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Abstract
Stakeholder engagement is often considered an essential component of regulatory policymak-
ing and governance. Our main aim in this paper is to explain variation in stakeholder engage-
ment across regulatory trajectories. More specifically we aim to assess why some regulatory 
policymaking processes attract a larger and more diverse set of stakeholders, while others at-
tract much smaller and more homogenous regulatory crowds. We build on a newly established 
dataset of primary data regarding stakeholder engagement in EU regulatory governance to test 
our assumptions. We find that both the salience and the number of different consultation in-
struments affect the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement, whereas the complexity 
of regulations seems to mainly affect the density of stakeholder engagement. The combination 
of both institutional and regulation-specific drivers of stakeholder engagement in regulatory 
governance yields relevant implications for the study of responsive regulation and the role 
stakeholders can fulfill in regulatory decision-making.
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Introduction
Stakeholder engagement has become a prominent principle in the study and practice of (supra)
national regulatory policymaking and governance. The OECD considers stakeholder engage-
ment in regulatory governance a good governance practice: “The central objective of regulatory 
policy – ensuring that regulations are designed and implemented in the public interest – can 
only be achieved with help from those concerned by regulations – the stakeholders” (OECD 
2016, p. 3). The importance of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance has long been 
identified in the literature on regulatory governance (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Black 2003; 
Coglianese, Zeckhauser and Parson 2004) and more recently through the regulatory interme-
diary framework, which theorizes the different roles stakeholders can fulfill in regulatory gov-
ernance. Engaging stakeholders will benefit the regulatory process throughout the different 
stages, including both ‘downstream’ roles (monitoring and compliance) and ‘upstream’ roles 
such as providing expertise and in advisory functions (Abbott and Snidal 2013; Abbott, Levi-
Faur and Snidal 2017; Brès, Mena and Salles-Djelic 2019; Martinez, Verbruggen and Fearne 
2013). In addition, stakeholder engagement has been related to the effectiveness and legiti-
macy of governance (e.g. Bingham, Nabatchi and O’Leary 2005) and is often considered critical 
to both collect necessary policy input and ensure alignment between regulations and the public 
interest (European Commission 2017; OECD 2012). 
We will contribute to the study of stakeholder engagement in (supra)national regulatory gov-
ernance by explaining the number (density) and type (diversity) of stakeholders that engage 
with policymakers in regulatory governance, defined as the process by which multiple public 
and private stakeholders participate to advance regulations (Gray and Lowery 1996; Lowery 
et al. 2015; see also Arras 2017; Berkhout et al 2015; Halpin and Jordan 2012; Leech et al 
2005). Our main aim in this paper is therefore to assess why some supranational regulatory 
processes attract a large and diverse set of stakeholders, while others attract a much smaller 
and more homogenous set of stakeholders. Our analysis and findings make a twofold contribu-
tion to the study of stakeholder engagement in (supra)national regulatory governance. First, 
we contribute by developing an analytical framework which we empirically test to demonstrate 
how contextual factors affect stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance. Second, our 
findings indicate that the future models of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance 
can be better specified by explicitly including regulation-specific and institutional explanatory 
factors.
In the remainder of this paper, we first discuss the importance of examining stakeholder en-
gagement for the study of (supra)national regulatory governance. We then introduce our theo-
retical framework of key regulation-specific and institutional factors to explain variance in 
stakeholder engagement. More specifically, we focus on regulation-specific (i.e., salience and 
complexity) and institutional-level characteristics (i.e., consultation instruments and admin-
istrative capacity) to explain why stakeholder engagement varies across European Union (EU) 
regulations. The EU is considered a typical case of the regulatory state (Majone 1997) and has 
one of the most extensive and transparent consultation regimes. Specifically, we focus on how 
the European Commission involves stakeholders in the regulatory-formulation stage. Being 
one of the most elaborate and ambitious consultative regimes (Bunea 2017, p. 47), the EU 
stands as a relevant case to examine the determinants of stakeholder engagement in regula-
tory processes. To test our assumptions, we drew on novel datasets of stakeholder engagement 
in EU regulatory governance: a regulatory database consisting of 47 regulations passed by the 
EU in the period 2015-2016, containing an extensive analysis of regulatory characteristics, and 
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a stakeholder database that comprises key organizational features of 2,656 stakeholders that 
mobilized for these regulations. We focused on a two-year period as this enabled us to collect 
data on regulations in a variety of policy domains, as well as other quantitative (e.g. media 
data) and qualitative data through interviews with public officials and stakeholders.
Our main finding is that salience and the specific usage of consultation instruments explain 
both the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement, whereas complexity only seems to 
affect the density of stakeholder engagement. We did not find significant effects of adminis-
trative capacity on both the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement. Our analysis 
suggests that for better explanations of the effect of stakeholder engagement in regulatory 
governance, regulation-specific characteristics as well as institutional arrangements are impor-
tant conditions to consider.  
Explaining stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance
An important explanation within the literature on interest representation and particularly rel-
evant for examining stakeholder engagement in supranational regulatory governance concerns 
the type and level of government activities. Such ‘demand-side’ factors are generally positively 
associated with the type and number of stakeholders that engage with the decision-making 
process (Gray Lowery and Benz 2013; Halpin, Fraussen and Nownes 2018; Klüver and Zeidler 
2018; Leech et al 2005; Lowery and Gray 2004, Lowery et al 2004). In the same vein, we expect 
such demand side factors, i.e. both institutional and regulation-specific contextual factors, to 
affect stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance. 
More precisely, we develop a framework to systematically assess sources of variation in the 
number (density) and type (diversity) of stakeholders involved in regulatory governance. We 
refer to stakeholders collectively as the set of any type of organization that has a stake in 
particular regulatory policy issues, such as firms, business associations, NGOs, civil society 
organizations and public authorities. In the context of this paper, density refers to the num-
ber of stakeholders that mobilized around a specific regulation. Previous research has demon-
strated that density varies considerably across policy sectors and policy issues (e.g. Berkhout 
et al 2015; Klüver and Zeidler 2018; Messer, Berkhout and Lowery 2011), with typically a few 
issues generating high levels of stakeholder mobilization, and many issues receiving very little 
attention from stakeholders. Whereas the former pattern has been described as a “bandwagon 
effect”, as more stakeholders jump on board when an issue starts moving, the latter has been 
referred to as “quiet corners” (Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Halpin 2011; see also Culpepper 
2010, 248), for which only a few stakeholders become engaged. Clearly, variation in the density 
of stakeholders will strongly affect policymaking dynamics, and consequently also affect the 
possible role and impact of stakeholders (e.g. Breunig and Koski 2018; Hanegraaff, Beyers and 
Braun 2011). Rather than the sheer number of mobilized actors, diversity refers to the variety 
of substantive interests that engage with policymakers, often conceptualized as the presence 
of different organizational types or models (e.g. Lowery, Gray and Fellowes 2005; Minkoff, 
Aisenbrey and Agnone 2008). Diversity is at least equally relevant as density, as it is assumed 
to affect the variety in perspectives, voices and information that get heard by policymakers 
(Berkhout, Hanegraaff and Braun 2017; Beyers and Arras 2019; Pedersen, Halpin and Rasmus-
sen 2015; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014). 
Density and diversity are related, yet not in a simple linear way. That is, the involvement of 
more stakeholders does not necessarily result in a greater diversity among engaged stakehold-
ers. Research has shown that both population dynamics (the number and type of stakeholders 
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that are already mobilized) and institutional factors affect both density and diversity in related 
yet distinct ways (Lowery et al 2005; Lowery and Gray 2016). Understanding how regulation-
specific and institutional contextual factors affect both the density and diversity of stakeholder 
engagement across regulatory processes helps to better specify models of stakeholder engage-
ment. Moreover, it improves our understanding of variation in the responsiveness or biased 
nature characterizing regulatory processes, as well as the intermediary role stakeholders can 
potentially fulfill in the regulatory process. We focus on selected regulation-specific charac-
teristics, including salience and complexity, as such issue-characteristics are generally consid-
ered important to take into account when explaining stakeholder engagement (Beyers, Dür 
and Wonka 2018). In addition, institutional factors have been shown to affect stakeholder 
engagement as well, and both consultation arrangements (Fraussen, Albareda and Braun 2020; 
Halpin and Fraussen 2017; Pedersen et al. 2015; Van Ballaert 2015) and administrative capac-
ity (Baekgaard, Mortensen and Seeberg 2018; Bark and Bell 2019) are particularly relevant 
for explaining stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance. In the next section, we ex-
plain these regulation-specific and institutional characteristics in more detail, and formulate 
hypotheses considering their effect on the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement in 
regulatory governance. 
Hypotheses
First, as regards regulation-specific factors, we expect that the salience of a regulation, de-
fined here as the relative political attention some specific regulatory issue gains compared to 
other regulatory issues, affects the size and kind of regulatory mobilization (Klüver, Braun and 
Beyers 2015).  Salient regulations are more visible to potentially interested actors and con-
stituents, which is expected to foster the mobilization not only of those actors that normally 
mobilize, but also of those who represent diffuse interests – thus increasing the density and 
the diversity of stakeholder engagement (De Bruycker, Berkhout and Hanegraaff 2019). Previ-
ous research has demonstrated that as legislative proposals increase in salience, they become 
more multidimensional and thus speak to multiple audiences. In such cases, a larger number 
and often more diverse set of stakeholders will face greater incentives to mobilize and become 
politically active (Baumgartner et. al 2009; Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008; Hanegraaff and 
Berkhout 2018; Klüver et al. 2015; Schattschneider 1960). We expect a similar dynamic of con-
flict expansion and the mobilization of a larger (denser) and more diverse set of stakeholders 
to apply to regulations. 
H1: The more salient a regulation, the higher the levels of density and diversity char-
acterizing stakeholder mobilization.
Second, we expect that the level of complexity of a regulation affects the size and kind of stake-
holder mobilization. In the case of regulatory governance, the direction of this relationship is 
less clear-cut than the anticipated effect of salience for stakeholder engagement during the 
legislative phase. Complexity is defined as the ‘degree to which a given policy problem is dif-
ficult to analyze, understand or solve' (Klüver 2013: 58). On the one hand, higher complexity 
is expected to result in a negative relationship with the quantity and type of stakeholder mobi-
lization, as fewer stakeholders will be capable of offering relevant policy goods and hence have 
fewer incentives to mobilize (Bouwen 2004; Braun 2012; Klüver et al 2015; ). At the same time, 
in regulatory governance, commonly associated with expert engagement (see Majone 1997), 
such a negative relationship might be less outspoken or even be absent given the significant 
prevalence of experts in the process. So, while we expect an effect of regulatory complexity, at 
this point we have no concrete assumption regarding the direction of this effect. 
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H2: The level of complexity characterizing a regulation will affect the levels of density 
and diversity characterizing stakeholder mobilization. 
In addition to regulation-specific characteristics, we also expect institutional factors to affect 
the density and diversity of stakeholder mobilization. Consultation tools vary in their degree 
of openness and hence shape the number and type of stakeholders they filter into the policy 
system (Pedersen et al. 2015; see also Bunea 2017; Rasmussen and Carroll 2013; Van Ballaert 
2017). In EU regulatory governance, many approaches involve a combination of open and 
closed consultation tools, such as online consultation, advisory committees, expert groups and 
workshops (see Fraussen et al. 2020 for a more detailed discussion). Our assumption is that 
as more tools are being applied, both the number and diversity of stakeholders will increase. 
H3: The more consultation tools have been applied, the higher the levels of density 
and diversity characterizing stakeholder mobilization. 
Furthermore, studies of stakeholder engagement at the EU-level have demonstrated variance 
of stakeholder mobilization patterns within specific EU institutions, for instance across differ-
ent Directorate-Generals, as well as inter-institutional variation in stakeholder mobilization, 
such as the European Commission versus European Parliament, because of the varying infor-
mational demand by either distinct units of a particular public institution or across distinct 
public institutions (Broscheid and Coen 2003; Coen and Katsaitis 2013; 2017; Princen and 
Kerremans 2008; Rasmussen and Carroll 2013). We focus on how the administrative capacity 
of public institutions, defined as “the ability to perform functions, solve problems and set and 
achieve objectives” (OECD 2003, p 5), affects stakeholder engagement in regulatory processes. 
More specifically, we focus on one particular dimension of administrative capacity, namely the 
human resources of public agencies (see Berkhout et al. 2015 for a similar approach). On the 
one hand, higher administrative capacities might result in a lower number and type of stake-
holders (Berkhout et al. 2015; Bouwen 2004; Coen and Katsaitis 2013), the assumption be-
ing that higher administrative capacity implies more internal know-how and policy expertise, 
which reduces the need for information provided by stakeholders (Baekgaard et al. 2018). On 
the other hand, these higher administrative capacities might also improve the ability of public 
institutions to engage with a wider set of stakeholders, either to collect more relevant exper-
tise or to ensure broader societal legitimacy (Thomson and Perry 2006). As both expectations 
appear plausible, we posit no directional effect but a general hypothesis regarding the effect of 
institutional administrative capacities.
H4: Variation in administrative capacities across Directorate-Generals will affect the 
levels of density and diversity characterizing stakeholder mobilization. 
Design 
The strong emphasis on regulatory governance in the EU and its Member States as well as 
the general demand for interest representation and inter- and intra-institutional variation of 
interest representation in the EU, render it a highly relevant case to study the (variation of) 
the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement in supranational regulatory governance. 
First of all, the EU’s nature as a regulatory state (Majone 1997) renders it a relevant case for an 
assessment of stakeholder engagement in supranational regulatory governance, also consider-
ing that most regulation in EU Member States nowadays originates at the EU-level or at the 
very least from the interplay between national and EU-level governance. Second, as in other 
national political systems, we have witnessed a positive correlation between government ac-
tivity and interest group mobilization in EU governance more generally (Berkhout and Lowery 
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2010; Coen and Richardson 2009, Coen and Katsaitis 2013; 2017; Princen and Kerremans 
2008; Wonka et al 2010). In addition, multiple studies test institutional factors as explanatory 
variables for stakeholder mobilization in the EU (Broscheid and Coen 2003; Coen and Katsaitis 
2013; 2017; Princen and Kerremans 2008; Rasmussen and Carroll 2013), or more directly 
examine demand-side effects as part of population ecology models of interest mobilization. 
These studies have shown a significant effect of demand-side factors for stakeholder engage-
ment at the EU level as well (Berkhout et al 2015). In sum, the nature of the EU as a regulatory 
state and general significant stakeholder engagement warrant a study of stakeholder engage-
ment in regulatory governance. Specifically, we focus on the European Commission, as the 
EU institution with the exclusive right to initiate regulations. During the policy-formulation 
stage, that is, before the Commission publishes a regulatory proposal that will then go to the 
European Parliament and the Council of the EU, Commission officials reach out and interact 
with stakeholders through different consultation mechanisms to obtain political and expert 
information about the regulatory issue under discussion.
To test our hypotheses regarding stakeholder engagement in EU regulatory governance, we 
constructed two datasets. First, we constructed a regulatory database including characteris-
tics of specific regulatory proposals to facilitate the study of regulation-specific characteris-
tics. These proposals were selected based on a full overview of EU legislative output in the 
period 2015-2016 in the context of a larger research project on stakeholder engagement in 
supranational regulatory governance led by one of the authors. We first selected all output 
that followed the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) and downloaded the 127 legislations 
through Euro-Lex. We opted for legislation following the OLP as it is the current standard 
decision-making procedure for adopting EU legislation (European Union, 2007) and allows us 
to control for non-equivalent decision-making procedures. To select the regulatory proposals 
from this full list of OLP output, we define regulation as the intentional intervention in the 
activities of a target population, following Koop and Lodge (2017, p. 95-108). For our study, we 
consider interventions to be of a direct and/or indirect nature, the activities can be economic 
and/or non-economic, the regulatee may equally be a public-sector or private-sector actor, and 
we refine our analyses to public-sector regulators. While the majority of the cases in our regula-
tory database are actual regulations, we also included legislative cases with a strong regulatory 
dimension. Additionally, to account for variation across policy areas (Van Ballaert 2017), we 
examine six different policy areas in which the EU has exclusive or shared competences with 
the Member States: (1) Finance, banking, pensions, securities, insurances; (2) State aids, com-
mercial policies; (3) Health; (4) Sustainability, energy, environment; (5) Transport, telecom-
munications; (6) Agriculture and fisheries. As a consequence, our dataset excludes cases that 
were exclusively distributional in nature (n=10), centered on EU agency functioning or EU 
internal matters (n=8) could not be classified in any of the six policy domains of interest for 
the study (n = 36) and codifications of previous regulations (n = 9). Out of the 64 remaining 
regulations, our analysis of the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement in regulatory 
governance focuses on the 47 regulations for which certain types of formal consultation tools 
have been employed by the European Commission. 
Our second dataset includes the stakeholders that were involved in the 47 regulations that 
had some sort of formal consultation tools in place, including open (online) consultations, 
conferences, public hearings and events, workshops, meetings and seminars, expert groups of 
the Commission and direct meetings with Commission officials (European Commission 2017). 
To obtain a complete list of stakeholders, we consulted the Commission’s proposals, available 
consultation documents, and impact assessments. As we aimed to obtain as comprehensive a 
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picture of stakeholder engagement as possible, we also reviewed other official documents, EU 
websites, register of expert groups. Furthermore, when the list of stakeholders participating 
in a particular type of consultation could not be identified via these publicly available sourc-
es, we contacted the responsible DG to request the list of stakeholders involved. Combining 
all these approaches, we identified 2,656 stakeholders, including firms and institutions, but 
excluding private citizens and anonymous responses to the Commission's consultations. We 
coded each identified stakeholder following a well-established method in recent interest group 
studies (Berkhout et al. 2017; 2018; Bernhagen et al. 2016; Beyers et al. 2014). Relying on 
publicly available data from different organization’s websites, human coders identified several 
key features of the 2,656 stakeholders, including type of group, level of mobilization, country 
of origin, policy focus, and nature of membership (if applicable). 
Dependent variables: density and diversity 
The dependent variables of our analysis include the density and diversity of the 2.656 stake-
holders engaged in the set of 47 regulations. These variables are measured by examining the 
type and number of interest groups involved via consultation tools for the regulations for 
which consultation tools were employed. Density is measured as the count of the absolute 
number of stakeholders involved in each regulation and ranges from 1 to 341 groups per regu-
lation. Our measure of diversity of each regulation is the Shannon-normalized index based on 
a 10-category classification (citizen groups, trade unions, professional associations, business 
associations, firms, research institutes, institutions, national authorities, EU authorities, and 
others (including courts, foreign public authorities, and international organizations)).1 This 
coding scheme treats professional associations, business associations and individual firms as 
distinct stakeholders to allow for the idea of business pluralism (Eising 2007; see also Pagliari 
and Young 2016). Similar to the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and other diversity indices, the 
Shannon index summarizes the diversity of a population (in our case all actors involved in 
a regulation) in which each member (i.e., stakeholder) belongs to a unique group (i.e., actor 
type). As shown by Boydstun et al. (2014), Shannon’s H and its normalized form minimize 
the danger of spurious findings that could result from less sensitive Herfindahl measures. We 
use the normalized form (divide Shannon-H by the natural log of the total number of actor 
types) to transform the final output into a value between 0 and 1 for easier comparability (see 
Boydstun et al 2014).2
Independent and control variables 
Our first set of independent variables concerns the regulation-specific characteristics. The 
first characteristic considered is salience of the regulation, which, as discussed by Beyers et al. 
(2017), can be captured in different ways. We focus here on the degree of attention that a regu-
lation attracted in the media. Thus, salience is calculated by counting the number of relevant 
1 — We conducted an inter-coder reliability test for a randomly selected set of 100 observations from the complete 
sample list of stakeholders collected. Two coders independently coded six variables for these 100 observations. The 
Krippendorff’s inter-coder reliability test for variable used to construct diversity measures (i.e., actor type) was 
α=0.833, which confirms the reliability of the data (Krippendorff 2004).
2 — Normalized Shannon’s where: 
xi represents an item (i.e. each actor type); 
p(xi) is the proportion of total attention the item receives (i.e. relative proportion of involvement of each actor type); 
ln p(xi) is the natural log of the proportion of attention the item receives; 
ln(N) is the natural log of the total number of items (i.e. total number of actor types).
– ∑n -1(p(x1)) + In p(x1)
In (N)
H=
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articles published in five EU-wide outlets (De Bruycker et al 2019). In the analyses we use the 
log of this count variable because we expect that the size of the effect of salience decreases as 
salience increases.3 Second, we understand complexity as the “degree to which a given policy 
problem is difficult to analyze, understand or solve” (Klüver 2013, p. 58), and we measure the 
complexity of a regulation by examining the readability of the proposal. Readability refers to 
the “ease of understanding or comprehension due to the style of writing” (Klare, 1963, p.1). 
Regulatory proposals of the Commission present the different aspects that a regulation is in-
tended to address. In this case, the main assumption is that that the more technically demand-
ing a regulation, the more difficult it will be in terms readability. We therefore used one of the 
most commonly used text readability measures of every policy proposal in our sample. More 
specifically, to measure complexity we rely on the Flesch Kincaid readability score (Kincaid 
et al., 1975), which is widely accepted and used in fields of medicine (Paasche-Orlow, Taylor 
and Brancati, 2003), education (Duffy and Kabance, 1982) as well as in business management 
(Wang, Hsieh and Sarkis 2018).4 The higher the value of the score, the more complex the regu-
lation. 
Regarding the institutional factors, we measured the effect of consultation arrangements on 
density and diversity by counting the number of different consultation tools employed by EU 
institutions to facilitate the dialogue and the engagement of stakeholders. We rely on an adapt-
ed version of the consultation tools listed by the European Commission Better Regulation 
Guidelines.5 Second, following recent research on interest group mobilization in the EU (e.g. 
Berkhout et al. 2015), we measure administrative capacities of the respective Directorates-
Generals (DGs), which are responsible for each regulation. We focus on a particular aspect of 
administrative capacity, namely the human resources of institutions (see Bark and Bell 2019, 
for a similar approach). More specifically, we operationalized administrative capacity as the 
number of staff working in each DG (Berkhout et al. 2015).6 The final variable, “Administrative 
capacity”, consists of the log of this variable.7 
We add an organizational field factor as a control variable to examine the robustness of our reg-
ulation-specific and institutional factors. The key inter-organizational explanatory mechanism 
in the study of interest representation regarding the density (and diversity) of a stakeholder 
community is the so-called carrying capacity of a given domain or sector. That is, the number 
of viable politically active organizations can be largely predicted by the number of potential 
constituents within a given community (Berkhout et al 2015; Lowery et al 2005; Lowery and 
3 — The time frame we use to collect articles ranges from two years before the first consultation tool was implemented 
up to 31st of December 2017. The outlets included in the Factiva search are: Financial Times, Politico Europe, Agence 
Europe, EurActive, EUObserver, and European Voice. For each regulation a search code was developed including key 
terms related to the regulation and general terms related to the EU decision making process. Subsequently, human 
coders went through the articles obtained via the Factiva search and excluded those that were not deemed as relevant. 
That is, only those that specifically discussed the regulation or the regulatory process leading to the regulation included 
in our sample were coded as relevant.
4 — Following Kincaid et al. (1975), the formula to obtain the readability scores reads as follows: 
0.39 * average sentence length + 11.8 * (number of syllables /number of words) - 15.59.
5 — see http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/tool_50_en.htm). These are: (1) open/public (online) 
consultation; (2) survey and questionnaire; (3) stakeholder conference/public hearings/events; (4) stakeholder meet-
ings/workshops/seminars; (5) focus groups; (6) interviews; (7) commission expert groups/similar entities; (8) SME 
panels; (9) consultations of local/regional authorities (networks of the Committee of the Regions); (10) direct consul-
tation of special stakeholder groups (including Member States); (11) others.
6 — For staff, see Human Resources Key Figures of the European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/
files/european-commission-hr-key-figures_2016_en.pdf. 
7 — This log-transformation is justified by the presence of one outlier: DG Agriculture, whose budget includes subsi-
dies to Members States and thus is significantly higher than the other DGs – it represents 38% of the total budget.
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Gray 2016; Hanegraaff, Beyers, and Braun 2011). This leads us to expect that the number of 
potential constituents of a domain is positively related (but at a declining rate) to the number 
of mobilized stakeholders. 
In order to measure the overall density of the included regulatory domains, or their carrying 
capacity, we needed a measure that validly captures the overall community of active stake-
holders. In US research, for instance, such measures have been constructed by using (state or 
federal) lobby register data to count the overall number of mobilized stakeholders (Leech et al 
2005; Lowery and Gray 1996). We used the Transparency Register, the register commissioned 
by both the EU Commission and the EU Parliament, which includes stakeholders who have 
been consulted by one of the EU institutions.8 The transparency register has been criticized for 
its reliability, given the voluntary nature of registrations. Yet its quality and inclusion of stake-
holders has improved in recent years, rendering it useful for the purpose of academic research 
(Berkhout et al 2018; Greenwood and Dreger 2013). Our measure of the organizational field 
factor is constructed on the domain rather than the regulation or DG level to account for the 
effect of the wider interest community on regulation-specific mobilization. It is a count of the 
number of stakeholders for each of the six domains in our regulatory sample. We matched our 
policy domains with the different “fields of interest” distinguished in the Transparency Regis-
ter (see Table A1 in the Appendix). We subsequently included the logged number of stakehold-
ers registered in each domain to construct the measure of density, as we assume a decreasing 
effect size as the number of stakeholders increases (Klüver 2013, 120). Tables A2 and A3 in 
the Appendix present the descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients of the variables 
included in our models.      
Analysis: the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement in eu 
regulatory governance
We first assess the total number and type of stakeholders that were mobilized. This can be 
observed in Figure 1, which presents the distribution of stakeholders in the 47 regulations 
with stakeholder involvement. We relate the density of the mobilized actors to their overall 
diversity. Figure 1 shows a rather typical overall mobilization pattern that has also been ob-
served in earlier studies of EU legislative politics (e.g. Wonka et al 2018), as well as research 
on stakeholder mobilization in different political systems at the national level (Baumgartner 
and Leech 2001, Halpin 2011). Yet, compared to previous studies, the pattern is considerably 
less skewed. For instance, Baumgartner and Leech, who examined lobbying patterns in the 
US on a random sample of 137 issues, found that the median issue attracted 15 groups, while 
4 issues were characterized by lobbying of more than 500 groups. In our dataset, the median 
issue engaged 109 stakeholders, while we do not have strong outliers with very high levels of 
mobilization. Furthermore, whereas Baumgartner and Leech had many issues on which almost 
no rival groups were active, we do not have a long tail of regulations with very limited stake-
holder mobilization. So, while the overall mobilization patterns follow a similar trend, there 
also appear typical characteristics of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance. Com-
pared to earlier work that also included policy measures that are not regulatory in nature, in 
our sample fewer issues are characterized by either high levels of conflict expansion or very low 
mobilization of stakeholders. At face value, Figure 1 also presents a clear correlation between 
density and the two diversity measures, indicating a positive relationship between density and 
diversity. At the same time, a correlation of .64 also indicates that this relationship is not as 
8 — https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/service-standards-and-principles/transparency/trans-
parency-register_en
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straightforward as it might seem, as high density does not always result in high diversity and 
vice versa (see also Table A3 in the Appendix). This is an important argument for examining the 
factors driving density and diversity separately.
Figure 1: Stakeholder mobilization across regulations with consultations tools
Source: The Authors
Explaining the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement 
We ran several regression models to estimate the effect of the explanatory factors on density 
and diversity measures of our sampled regulations. Due to the small n, we discuss the results 
while comparing them with the bivariate relationship between the variables presented in the 
correlation matrix in Table A3 Tables 1 and 2 present three models for each dependent vari-
able, the first two models (i.e., "a" and "b") only include regulation-specific and institutional fac-
tors, while in the third model (i.e., "c") we control for the organizational field factor. To analyze 
density, we opt for a negative binomial regression since our dependent variable is a count vari-
able and highly skewed. We used a fractional regression model to analyze the effects of our fac-
tors on the diversity measure. This is an appropriate approach considering the distribution of 
both variables and the fact that they range between 0 and 1 and are measured as a proportion 
(Papke and Wooldridge 1996). In addition, we conducted variance inflation factor (VIF) test to 
control for possible multi-collinearity effects among our explanatory factors. Importantly, all 
the VIF values are below two, which is an acceptable value that indicates low correlation among 
the variables (see also Table A3 in the Appendix). 
Table 1 presents the findings for the explanatory factors of density of stakeholder engagement 
at the regulation-level. First, model 1a indicates that more salient and complex regulations 
tend to have more stakeholders involved. Aligned with H1, the effect for salience is constant, 
even when controlling for institutional factors and for domain-level stakeholder density. Public 
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visibility thus fosters stakeholder engagement. Regarding H2 on complexity, models 1b and 
1c lead to a p-value close to 0.1, thus our results should be interpreted with caution, also be-
cause our bivariate analyses do not present a significant relationship between complexity and 
density (see Table A3 in the Appendix). The positive coefficients indicate that more complex 
regulations require more input from a larger set of stakeholders. Regarding our second set of 
hypotheses on institutional factors, we first observe that the number of consultation tools 
implemented by public officials has a positive relationship with density. In addition, the sig-
nificant and negative relationship between density and administrative capacity that is found in 
the correlation matrix (see Table A3) cannot be confirmed in our multivariate analyses as the p-
value of the negative estimates in model 1c is 0.374. However, alternative operationalizations 
of administrative capacity, focusing on the absolute budget of the DGs instead of the staff, do 
lead to significant results (see Table A4 in the Appendix). Lastly, the supply-side factor, do-
main density, is negatively related to the level of density, yet the p-value is 0.129, indicating a 
weak relationship between the variables. However, this negative association could indicate an 
explanatory effect of carrying capacity as it suggests that a higher density is related to fewer 
mobilized stakeholders. 
Table 1: Assessing density of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c













































N 47 47 47
Source: The Authors
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In Table 2 we observe that salience and the number of consultation tools are the most impor-
tant factors explaining stakeholder diversity, hence confirming H1 and H3. This means that 
the higher the salience of the regulation, the more diverse the set of stakeholders that gets 
involved. This aligns with previous findings (see Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2018) and confirms 
that a more diverse set of stakeholders gets mobilized on a regulation when it becomes more 
visible to the public. Regarding the institutional demand-side factors, only the number of con-
sultation tools significantly affects the diversity of stakeholder engagement. In contrast to 
other studies, we do not find significant effects of the administrative capacity of the DG, sug-
gesting that regulation-specific demand side factors are more important explanatory factors 
for diversity. Importantly, this non-significant relationship holds when operationalizing ad-
ministrative capacity in terms of budget instead of staff (see Table A5 in the Appendix). Lastly, 
our supply-side variable (i.e., density per domain), is significantly and negatively related to the 
level of diversity of regulations. 
Table 2: Assessing diversity of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c













































N 47 47 47
Source: The Authors
Overall, our findings suggest that regulation-specific and institutional factors affect the density 
and diversity of stakeholder engagement. Salience and the number of consultation tools seem 
to explain both density and diversity, but the complexity of the regulation seems to matter 
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only for density and does not seem to be relevant for attracting more diverse set of stakehold-
ers. In other words, highly technical regulations demand more input, but not necessarily from 
a diverse set of stakeholders. Another relevant difference relates to the effect of administrative 
capacity, which seems to matter for density – a negative relationship – but not for diversity. 
Robustness checks
We ran several robustness checks. First, to examine whether our findings are applicable to 
regulatory processes without consultation arrangements we run t-tests comparing the means 
of our two main regulation-specific variables (i.e., salience and complexity). The results are sig-
nificant, suggesting that cases with formal consultation vary significantly from cases without 
formal consultation (cf. Van Ballaert 2017) in terms of salience and complexity. However, if we 
run models "a" and "b" to test our main hypotheses while including the full set of regulations, 
including those that did not have stakeholder involvement, we obtain similar results for den-
sity and diversity (see Table A6 and A7 in the Appendix). While the nature of the regulatory 
processes is different, it does not seem to affect our findings regarding the main explanatory 
factors of density and diversity. In addition, we conducted bootstrapping simulations as a re-
sampling strategy to assess the robustness of our findings. The bootstrap resampling method 
included 1000 runs to compute confidence intervals around the observed coefficients of the 
regression models (see Table A8 in Appendix). Taken together, these robustness checks lend 
support to the analyses based on our sample of regulatory issues. 
Conclusion and discussion 
Stakeholder engagement has long been posited as a necessary component of regulatory gov-
ernance and recent advancements in the literature specify different intermediary roles of 
stakeholders to engage with the regulatory process (Abbott et al 2017). As different numbers 
and types of stakeholders capable of engaging with the regulatory process will affect both the 
potential outcomes of stakeholder engagement as well as the intermediary roles stakeholders 
can fulfill, understanding the explanatory factors of the density and diversity of stakeholder 
engagement is warranted. Our findings indicate that the salience of a regulation and the num-
ber of different consultation tools employed by public institutions both affect the density and 
diversity of stakeholder engagement. The complexity of the regulation only seems to matter 
for the number of groups that get mobilized but is less relevant for explaining stakeholder 
diversity. In other words, highly technical regulations seemingly demand more input, but not 
necessarily from a diverse set of stakeholders. Another relevant difference between factors 
affecting density and diversity relates to the effect of administrative capacity, which seems to 
matter for density – negative relationship – but not for diversity. These are relevant findings as 
they point to the importance of regulation-specific explanatory factors for understanding and 
explaining both the number and type of stakeholders that engage with the regulatory process. 
Before discussing the implications of our findings, it is important to consider the limitations 
of our study. We examined stakeholder engagement for a selected set of regulatory propos-
als in EU governance in a given time period and for a specific role in the regulatory process. 
Although the robustness checks lend support to the external validity of our analyses, further 
research into the regulation-specific explanatory factors of stakeholder engagement is required 
to confirm and further specify these findings. To further test effects of regulation-specific and 
institutional factors on stakeholder engagement, future research could include a larger sample 
of regulatory proposals over a longer period of time and across various stages in the regulatory 
process. In addition, by studying stakeholder engagement in EU regulatory governance, we se-
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lected a likely case of stakeholder engagement given its extensive consultation arrangements, 
providing us with the opportunity to empirically distinguish between regulatory-specific and 
institutional explanatory factors. Research demonstrates that such contextual factors matter 
for stakeholder engagement in general (Beyers et al 2015), including other institutional fac-
tors, such as the degree of neo-corporatism or pluralism, characterizing stakeholder engage-
ment arrangements, or the type of lobby regulation in place (Chari et al 2019; but see Lowery 
and Gray 1997). We could not include these factors given our single case study of the EU as a 
most likely case of the regulatory state, but such contextual factors are obviously relevant to 
include, in addition to regulation-specific factors in future research into stakeholder engage-
ment in regulatory governance at (supra)national and local levels of governance.
Notwithstanding these considerations, our findings have important implications for research 
on stakeholder engagement in (supra)national regulatory governance in particular and stake-
holder engagement in policymaking more generally. As regards regulatory governance, the 
literature seems inconclusive about the potential impact of stakeholder engagement in (su-
pranational) regulatory governance. Studies regarding regulatory enrolment (Black 2003), re-
sponsive regulation (Abbott and Snidal 2013), and the recently emerging literature on regula-
tory intermediaries (Abbott et al 2017; Brès et al 2019) all emphasize the potential of involving 
stakeholders in regulatory trajectories for effective and responsive regulatory governance, as 
well as the drawbacks of stakeholder engagement, most notably regulatory capture. Examin-
ing the explanatory factors of the number and type of stakeholder engagement helps to better 
specify the conditions under which such stakeholder arrangements are likely to yield positive 
outcomes or instead harm both the process and outcome of regulatory governance. 
Our findings on stakeholder engagement also speak to stakeholder engagement beyond a mere 
focus on regulatory governance. While both salience and consultation tools relate to more di-
verse and denser stakeholder engagement, complexity of regulations results in bigger crowds, 
but not necessarily in more diverse engagement. These findings confirm the general finding 
that higher levels of government activity result in higher levels of stakeholder engagement, 
but not necessarily in more diverse stakeholder crowds. This can be explained by the complex 
interplay between the density and diversity of stakeholder communities (Lowery et al 2005; 
2015; Lowery and Gray 2016) as well as by a positive relationship between higher levels of 
government activity and a narrowed and more specialized policy engagement of stakeholders 
(Halpin and Thomas 2012). Understanding how density and diversity relate to each other in 
the context of regulatory governance is one of the likely avenues for future research as well 
as a more explicit comparative perspective regarding stakeholder engagement in legislative 
and regulatory decision-making to specify the distinctive and common explanatory factors of 
stakeholder engagement across public decision-making processes. 
In addition, our findings on the effect of consultation arrangements are in line with recent 
observations regarding the effect of the design of consultation arrangements (Arras and Braun 
2017; Bunea 2017, Fraussen et al. 2020; Halpin and Fraussen 2017; Pedersen et al. 2015; Van 
Ballaert 2015; 2017) on the density and diversity of stakeholder engagement. As consultation 
is often regarded as an important instrument for better regulation, assessing how the institu-
tional design and type of consultation arrangements affect both the density and diversity of 
stakeholder engagement, and the potential intermediary roles they can fulfill, is an important 
avenue for further research.
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Appendix
Table A1. Match between policy domains and fields of interest of the Transparency Register
Policy domains Fields of interest in the Transparency Register
Finance, banking, pensions, securities, insurances
Banking and financial services
Economy, Finance, and the Euro
















Maritime affairs and fisheries
Source: The Authors
Table A2. Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables across regula-
tions (n=47)
Variable Measurement Mean (S.D.) Min-Max
Dependent variables
Density Number of skateholders per regulation 109.1 (104.779) 1-341
Diversity Shannon-H Index .505 (.27) 0-.804
Explanatory factors: Demand-side variables
Regulation-specific characteristics
Salience Logged number of articles published that 
were related to the regulation
2.145 (1.364) 0-4.553
Complexity Flesch Kincaid readability score 20.640 (2.481) 16.909-30.350
Institutional-demand
Consultation tools Number of consultation tools used 2.251 (2.152) 0-8
Administrative capacity Number of staff per DG 591.043 (267.602) 159-1024
Control factor: Supply-side variables
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Table A3. Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables (n=47)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.Density 1
2.Diversity 0.646*** 1
3.Salience 0.451** 0.470*** 1
4.Complexity 0.215 0.205 -0.043 1
5.Consultation tools 0.484*** 0.581*** 0.290* 0.254* 1
6.Administrative capacity -0.0309* -0.027 -0.166 0.053 -0.040 1
7.Density per domain -0.199 -0.191 0.014 -0.233 0.119 0.170 1
+p≤.1; *p≤.05; ** p≤.01; ***p≤.001
Source: The Authors
Table A5. Assessing density of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Salience 0.319 (0.104) .002 0.272 (0.098) .006
Complexity 0.097 (0.057) .090 0.088 (0.056) .113
Consultation tools 0.164 (0.083) .049 0.202 (0.080) .012
Administrative capacity (DG 
budget logged)9
-0.075 (0.104) .468 -0.168 (0.101) .094
Density per domain -1.096 (0.481) .023
Intercept 1.764 (1.274) .166 9.831 (4.455) .011
AIC 63.152 64.919
PseudoR2: Nagelkerke .475 .576
N 47 47
Source: The Authors
9 — For budget, see Consolidated annual accounts of the EU of 2015, page 127: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/
biblio/documents/2015/EU_AnnualAccounts2015_EN.pdf.
This log-transformation is justified by the presence of one outlier: DG Agriculture, whose budget includes subsidies to 
Members States and thus is significantly higher than the other DGs – it represents 38% of the total budget.
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Table A5. Assessing density of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Salience 0.297 (0.107) .008 0.301 (0.106) .007
Complexity 0.045 (0.058) .439 0.015 (0.059) .803
Consultation tools 0.324 (0.090) >.001 0.362 (0.090) <.001
Administrative capacity (DG 
budget logged)10
0.077 (0.108) .480 0.038 (0.108) .727
Density per domain -1.089 (0.511) .039
Intercept -3.199 (1.356) .023 6.584 (4.754) .173
AIC 19.512 20.677
PseudoR2: Nagelkerke .445 .498
N 47 47
Source: The Authors
Table A6. Assessing density of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance
Model 1a Model 1b
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Salience 0.458 (0.159) 0.004 0.304 (0.131) 0.021
Complexity 0.245 (0.092) 0.008 0.130 (0.077) 0.098
Consultation tools 2.537 (0.274) <0.001
Administrative capacity -0.001 (0.001) 0.391
Intercept -1.771 (1.906) 0.353 -2.61433    1.51 0.085
AIC 80.086 82.109
PseudoR2: Nagelkerke 0.240 0.751
N 64 64
Source: The Authors
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Table A7. Assessing diversity of stakeholder engagement in regulatory governance
Model 2a Model 2b
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Salience 0.481 (0.128) <0.001 0.289 (0.116) 0.015
Complexity 0.227 (0.073) 0.003 0.065 (0.064) 0.319
Consultation tools 0.548 (0.087) <0.001
Administrative capacity 0.000 (0.001) 0.646
Intercept -6.14530    1.559 <0.001 -4.119 (1.366) 0.003
AIC 32.165 24.640
PseudoR2: Nagelkerke 0.312 0.650
N 64 64
Source: The Authors
Table A8. Confidence intervals based on bootstrap simulations10
10 — We ran bootstrap simulations for each of the models to calculate confidence intervals for the coefficients (1000 
runs each). The table below presents the bootstrapped confidence intervals around the coefficients attained through 
running the various regression models (90% confidence intervals).
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